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923 
COMMENT 
The Duty Dilemma: When the Duty to Mitigate Damages 
and the Duty to Preserve Evidence Collide 
I. Introduction 
 Much has been made about the importance of moral duty in contract 
law. For philosophical titans like David Hume
1
 and Emmanuel Kant,
2
 a 
contract is a device that binds men to the obligatory affects of their Word.
3
 
The ill-advised contractual renege evinces the moral turpitude of a society 
fallen asunder. For those who subscribe to Kant’s view, the law of contracts 
is permeated by the transcendent concept of duty.
4
 Because a contract 
creates duties where none previously existed, it is therefore the underlying 
promise to take some action that is the essence of a contract.
5
 
Contemporary American contract law borrows much from the moralistic 
lineage of Kantian ethics and Hume’s social contract.6 Accordingly, the 
breach of the modern contract invites an application of these ancient duty 
constructs, especially where two competing duties arise simultaneously.  
Twenty-first century American contract law is a fertile ground for the 
application of Kant and Hume’s approaches to duty. Nearly 270,000 civil 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Regarded as the greatest English philosopher, Hume made salient contributions to 
the philosophy of human nature. TERENCE PENELHUM, DAVID HUME: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
HIS PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM ix, 11 (1992). Although he spoke to “contracts” in the social 
sense, Hume posited that the obligations of contract are necessary to support a civilized 
society. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 
1-2 (2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2015).  
 2. A highly revered moral philosopher, Kant developed the categorical imperative, a 
“formula of universal law” which states that individuals ought to “[a]ct as if the maxim of 
[one’s] action were to become by [one’s] will a universal law of nature.” Mark 
Timmons, The Philosophical and Practical Significance of Kant's Universality Formulations 
of the Categorical Imperative, 13 JAHRBUCH FÜR RECHT UND ETHIK 313, 313 (2005). The 
imperative governs duties created via contract by appealing to the universal strictures of 
moral duty. See id. at 319. 
 3. FRIED, supra note 1, at 1. 
 4. See IMMANUEL KANT & H.J. PATON, THE MORAL LAW OR KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF 
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 13-14 (H.J. Paton ed., 3d ed. reprt. 1958) (stating Kant’s view 
that “[d]uty is the necessity to act out of reverence for the law”). 
 5. FRIED, supra note 1, at 1.  
 6. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: 
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 128-29 (1989) (ebook) (explaining how the legal thought 
of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was influenced by the musings of Kant and thus shaped 
Lochner-era jurisprudence). 
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actions were filed in the United States District Courts in 2017, of which 
23,523 sounded in contract.
7
 In the Oklahoma District Courts, 
approximately 2,700 civil suits were filed in 2017—410 were breach of 
contract actions.
8
 Breach of contract is a cause of action that covers a wide 
variety of matters, ranging from the Hannah Montana creator’s suit against 
Disney
9
 to a buyer’s complaint against Kold-Serve alleging receipt of a 
defective ice cream machine.
10
 Because the most complex breaches of 
contract are spawned in the backwater of undeveloped law, it is paramount 
that all parties understand the full extent of the duties they owe in order to 
mitigate legal risk. Unfortunately for the unfettered flow of business, this is 
easier said than done. It is not uncommon, due to the nature of contractual 
relationships and the unpredictable nature of business, for common law 
duties to arise simultaneously and appear to be mutually exclusive. It is in 
these situations that the legal risk to the contracting parties is at its highest.  
A hypothetical illustrates the conundrum. Suppose Buyer B purchases a 
double-offset disc plow
11
 from seller S to pull behind his tractor. The 
contract contains provisions expressly warranting its fitness as a farm 
implement in Midwestern wheat country. After several weeks, B discovers 
that the disc does not work properly and barely penetrates the soil. He 
originally purchased the disc because his old disc was saddled with 
ineffective hydraulic connections that made using it for more than a few 
hours impossible. Now, B has two useless discs. Pursuant to the sale 
contract, S makes several efforts to fix the implement but never gets it to 
function as promised. Eventually, B loses the luxury of time and begins to 
remove hydraulic pumps and hoses from the new disc and transplant them 
onto the old disc. Before long, B’s farm operation is up and running and he 
is back to work. But as the legal system is all too aware, this is not the end 
of the story. When poor weather conditions catch up with B and render him 
unable to finish his fields, he is furious—if S had not sold him a defective 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Federal Court Management Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS (Sept. 30, 2017), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0930.2017.pdf. 
Additionally, in 2005, United States state courts disposed of nearly 30,000 civil trials. LYNN 
LANGTON, M.A. & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY 
TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 1 (2009). Of those, nearly one-third were breach of 
contract actions. Id. at 2. 
 8. Federal Court Management Statistics, supra note 7. 
 9. Applebarry, Inc. v. Bigwood Films, Inc., No. B281327, 2018 WL 1149541, at *1-2 
(Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 2018).  
 10. Kold-Serve Corp. v. Ward, 736 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. App. 1987).  
 11. Offset/Tandom Disc-Type Tillage Implement, U.S. Patent No. 5,881,820 (filed Feb. 
21, 1997). 
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product back when the weather was fair, his work would be complete. 
Subsequently, B files a complaint in the local county court alleging breach 
of contract. S, preparing to defend the claim, seeks to establish the character 
of the disc as it was when he sold it. He finds, however, that this is nearly 
impossible—the disc has been stripped of all its hydraulic equipment and 
barely resembles what he originally sold to B.  
Enter: the Duty Dilemma. While S has a viable defense to the breach of 
contract claim—B’s failure to preserve evidence—B has a compelling 
rebuttal. In anticipation of economic damages, he altered the equipment to 
salvage his business operations and continue production. He was merely 
performing his duty to mitigate damages. This forces upon the court the 
unenviable task of determining which duty is superior—the duty to mitigate 
or the duty to preserve evidence. When a plaintiff-buyer materially alters 
equipment it purchased from the defendant-seller in order to mitigate its 
damages, and the seller asserts that the buyer breached its duty to preserve 
evidence, how should the law resolve these competing duties?  
The duty to preserve evidence and the duty to mitigate damages are not 
mutually exclusive. When a buyer anticipates bringing a breach of contract 
claim, it must give the seller an adequate opportunity to inspect the 
defective product. However, the opportunity to inspect is finite. The 
plaintiff-buyer has the last clear chance to avoid the collision of duties by 
granting the defendant-buyer a legally sufficient inspection prior to a 
foreseeable breach of contract claim. Failure by the defendant-seller to 
make such an inspection produces an inference in favor of the plaintiff-
buyer, rebuttable by negating the contract via traditional principles of 
contract law or a showing that the opportunity to inspect was inadequate.  
This Comment explores the history of the duty to mitigate and the duty 
to preserve evidence in the United States—specifically Oklahoma—and 
explains how parties that are susceptible to this clash of common law 
canons can minimize their legal risk. Part II illustrates the development and 
legal significance of evidence spoliation, exposing the issues that arise 
when the duty to preserve evidence is actionable in tort as the breach of a 
substantive duty, rather than just the violation of a court order. It then takes 
a similar look at the legal framework of the duty to mitigate and explains 
how the primordial “last clear chance rule” can help frame the issue. Part III 
addresses the conflict of law problem that has infiltrated the duty to 
preserve evidence and explains why the analysis confronts a crossroads; is 
the duty procedural, springing from the inherent authority of the courts to 
police themselves, or substantive, grounded in a fundamental duty to 
anticipate litigation and preserve material evidence? Part IV resurrects the 
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incomplete dicta in Mariposa Farms, LLC v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., and 
articulates a standard for measuring the sufficiency of a defendant-seller’s 
inspection opportunity, the significance of when alterations were made, and 
how the duties can be reconciled and performed simultaneously. Part IV 
then posits a solution to the Duty Dilemma and explains what to do when a 
plaintiff-buyer has been sold a defective product but is uncertain how to 
traverse the Duty Dilemma tightrope.  
II. Spoliation and the Duty to Mitigate 
A. The Duty to Preserve Evidence 
The breach of the duty to preserve evidence has gone by many names, 
but the most common is “spoliation,”12 a term that drips with negativity and 
legal fortunes gone awry. The underlying doctrine dates back nearly three 
hundred years ago to the case of Armory v. Delamirie.
13
 Considered by 
many as the mother of the spoliation doctrine, Armory encapsulated the 
affectionate melodrama of a chimney sweep who discovered a valuable 
jewel in the course of his work.
14
 When he took it to the goldsmith, a 
deceitful apprentice traded out the jewel and misled the chimney sweep to 
believe that his treasure was worth merely three halfpence.
15
 Unsatisfied 
with the amount, the chimney sweep demanded his jewel be returned.
16
 
When the apprentice fetched nothing but an empty socket, the sweep 
brought an action in trover to recover the missing jewel. At trial, “the Chief 
Justice directed the jury, that unless the [goldsmith] did produce the jewel, 
and shew it not to be of the finest water, they should presume the strongest 
against him, and make the value of the best jewels the measure of their 
damages: which they accordingly did.”17 The court then coined the now 
familiar axiom Contra spoliatorem omnia praesumuntur, meaning, “all 
things are presumed against a spoliator.”18 
Spoliation is the “destruction or material alteration of evidence or the 
failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See Patel v. OMH Med. Ctr., Inc., 1999 OK 33, ¶ 46, 987 P.2d 1185, 1202.  
 13. (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 1 Strange 505 (K.B.). 
 14. Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 517-18 n.12 (D. Md. 2009). 
 15. Id. at 517 n.12. 
 16. Id. at 517-18 n.12. 
 17. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. 664). 
 18. MARGARET M. KOESEL & TRACEY L. TURNBULL, SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE xv 
(Daniel F. Gourash ed., Am. Bar Ass’n 3d ed. 2013); Armory, 93 Eng. Rep. 664; see also 
Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988) (articulating the modern 
application of Armory), overruled by Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2009). 
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reasonably foreseeable litigation.”19 A great bane to the scholars of the 
field, the term is commonly mispronounced as “spoilation” as a result of its 
uncertain etymology.
20
 What is certain, however, is that spoliation is a 
pervasive issue that continues to undermine the judicial system.
21
 
According to early surveys of litigators, half surveyed “believe that ‘unfair 
and inadequate disclosure of material information prior to trial [is] a 
“regular or frequent” problem . . . [and] 69% of surveyed antitrust attorneys 
[have] encountered unethical practices,’ including, most commonly, 
destruction of evidence.”22 The temptation to spoliate evidence is great—
the civil discovery regime “make[s] spoliation the bad man’s choice.”23 
 At bottom, the duty to preserve evidence compels the maintenance and 
protection of admissible evidence when litigation is on the horizon.
24
 This 
duty does not manifest itself solely at the twilight of litigation, but 
frequently extends “to that period before the litigation when a party 
reasonably should know that the evidence may be relevant to anticipated 
litigation.”25 Thus, constructive notice is often the crux of the spoliation 
contention in civil litigation, requiring sensitive, case-by-case analysis of 
the facts to determine whether such a duty existed.
26
 
The duty to preserve evidence is a two-man game. A party with reason to 
believe that certain documents or tangible items might have evidentiary 
value in impending litigation must give the other party an adequate 
opportunity to inspect them.
27
 It must provide this opportunity even if it is 
not in control or possession of such evidence when litigation becomes 
foreseeable or when an alteration is about to be made.
28
 Because evidence is 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Barnett v. Simmons, 2008 OK 100, ¶ 21, 197 P.3d 12, 20 (citing West v. Goodyear 
Tire, 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)).  
 20. KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 18, at xv n.1. 
 21. Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil Litigation: The Need for 
Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 793, 793 (1991). 
 22. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal 
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 598-99 (1985)). 
 23. Id. at 795. 
 24. Barnett, ¶ 20, 197 P.3d at 20.  
 25. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 
(4th Cir. 1991)). 
 26. See, e.g., Henning v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 530 F.3d 1206, 1219 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(noting that the determination whether a dispatcher’s tapes are relevant and thus subject to 
the duty to preserve is a fact-specific inquiry); Jamie Weissglass & Rossana Parrotta, The 
Duty to Preserve and the Risks of Spoliation, N.Y. ST. B.J., Sept. 2014, at 27, 28 
(“Unfortunately, there is no bright-line test to determine when the duty is triggered.”). 
 27. Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 591. 
 28. Id. (citing Andersen v. Schwartz, 687 N.Y.S.2d 232, 234-35 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999)). 
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often discarded innocently in the course of business, the term “spoliation” 
encompasses the entire spectrum of intent, ranging from “intentional [to] 
negligent destruction or loss of tangible and relevant evidence which 
impairs a party’s ability to prove or defend a claim.”29 The level of intent 
determines the extent to which the court will employ its sanctioning 
power.
30
 Intentional spoliation of evidence is treated most harshly.
31
 While 
severe sanctions are generally reserved for willful, bad faith conduct, 
Oklahoma also permits sanctions for negligent alterations that precede 
foreseeable litigation.
32
 This assessment often comes down to the 
procedural posture of the litigation and whether a motion to compel has 
been filed.
33
 A motion to compel eliminates the need to find intent—the 
language of title 12, section 3237(B)(2) of the Oklahoma Statutes does not 
require it.
34
  
Although the period immediately prior to the commencement of 
litigation is the most heavily scrutinized for spoliation,
35
 it is not the only 
time that the duty presents itself. The alteration of evidence after a motion 
to compel has been filed is most conspicuous.
36
 In the spirit of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 37, Oklahoma law explicitly provides for its courts’ 
sanctioning authority when a motion to compel has been violated: 
If a party or an officer, director or managing agent of a party or a 
person designated under . . . this title to testify on behalf of a 
party fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, 
including an order made under subsection A of this section or 
Section 3235 of this title, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under subsection F of Section 3226 of this title, the court 
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to 
the failure as are just.
37
 
Subsection (A), in relevant part, describes the options for moving parties 
with regards to enforcing discovery: 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Barnett, ¶ 21, 197 P.3d at 20 (citing United States ex rel. Koch v. Koch Indus., 197 
F.R.D. 488, 490 (N.D. Okla. 1999)). 
 30. See Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 31. Barnett, ¶ 18, 197 P.3d at 19. 
 32. Id. ¶ 19, 197 P.3d at 19.  
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. ¶ 17, 197 P.3d at 19. 
 35. See id. ¶ 17-18, 197 P.3d at 19. 
 36. See id. 
 37. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3237(B)(2) (2011).  
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[I]f a party, in response to a request for inspection and copying 
submitted under Section 3234 of this title, fails to produce 
documents or respond that the inspection or copying will be 
permitted as requested or fails to permit the inspection or 
copying as requested . . . , the discovering party may move for an 
order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order 
compelling inspection and copying in accordance with the 
request or subpoena. The motion must include a statement that 
the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer 
either in person or by telephone with the person or party failing 
to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or 
material without court action.
38
 
Oklahoma has interpreted section 3237 to require a motion to compel 
before invoking sanctions.
39
 Moreover, sanctions arising under the general 
grant of section 3237 must spring from a party’s failure to obey an order of 
the court.
40
 It is important to note that a violation of a court order is not the 
only basis on which the court can sanction spoliation.
41
 Because courts have 
“inherent authority to impose sanctions for abuse of the discovery process,” 
they have “the power to sanction for abusive litigation practices or for 
abuse of judicial process, even if an order compelling discovery has not 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. § 3237(A)(2). 
 39. See, e.g., Barnett v. Simmons, 2008 OK 100, ¶¶ 14, 17, 197 P.3d 12, 18, 19 (citing 
Helton v. Coleman, 1991 OK 43, ¶¶ 10-11, 811 P.2d 100, 101 (indicting the trial court’s 
decision to sanction the defendant’s conduct when there had been no violation of an order 
under the discovery regime)) (holding that “[a] motion to compel is a prerequisite to 
sanctions being imposed under § 3237” and that intent speaks merely to the severity of the 
sanction, not whether one should be imposed). 
 40. Id. In Barnett, the court ordered the spoliator to produce his hard drive for 
examination. Id. ¶ 22, 197 P.3d at 20. Wasting no time, he hired a computer expert to “work 
on the computer” and perform other maintenance activities, all without informing the 
moving party’s counsel. Id. He insisted that the computer was simply undergoing a routine 
“check-up” and that he was a novice computer user with no intent to alter evidence. Id. ¶ 9, 
197 P.3d at 16. At no point was the expert notified that the computer and its hard drive were 
the subject of a court order. Id. ¶ 22, 197 P.3d at 20. The court ultimately found this conduct 
to be a textbook violation of section 3237(B)(2), explaining that intent is irrelevant and that 
failure to obey a court order is a strict liability offense. Id. ¶ 24, 197 P.3d at 21. Furthermore, 
it noted that the act of turning the computer over to an expert was “reasonably foreseeably 
destructive of evidence” and “d[id] in fact destroy evidence that [prejudiced] the opposing 
party’s right to a fair trial.” Id. ¶ 25, 197 P.3d at 21 (quoting Holm-Waddle v. William D. 
Hawley, M.D., Inc., 1998 OK 53, ¶ 10, 967 P.2d 1180, 1182). 
 41. See id. ¶ 14, 197 P.3d at 18. 
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been made.”42 When a party engages in this abusive conduct, there are a 
number of sanctions at the courts’ disposal.43 These include “refusing to 
allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or 
defenses, prohibiting the party from introducing designated matters in 
evidence, treating the failure to obey as contempt of court, dismissing the 
case or entering default judgment.”44 
It is important to note that the duty to preserve evidence extends to the 
parties’ agents as well.45 Because a corporation operates at the direction of 
its many human agents, spoliation presents unique issues in complex 
organizational structures.
46
 When spoliation occurs, and the defending party 
attempts to shift the blame by arguing that a third party destroyed the 
evidence, such a defense will not shield it from sanctions if that third party 
is deemed the spoliator’s agent.47 In one such case, plaintiffs were held 
responsible for the spoliation of an allegedly defective vehicle back seat 
when a third party repair garage discarded it, due to the fact that “plaintiffs 
retained counsel before repairs were begun and that they were fully aware 
that any potential lawsuit against Nissan would revolve around alleged 
defects in the driver's side seat.”48 Not surprisingly, the application of 
agency principles to the duty to preserve evidence has a substantial impact 
on parties with document retention policies.
49
 In circumstances where 
documents have been lost as a result of haphazard, willfully negligent 
retention policies, courts have invoked their inherent powers to sanction the 
spoliating conduct.
50
 
Agency law suggests that a litigant’s preservation obligations are shaped 
by the size of the organization.
51
 When litigation becomes reasonably 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. (citing Bentley v. Hickory Coal Corp., 1992 OK CIV APP 68, ¶ 15, 849 P.2d 
417, 420 (holding that the court’s broad sanctioning power allowed it to hold the plaintiff’s 
lawyer in contempt even after a voluntary dismissal)). 
 43. Id. ¶ 15, 197 P.3d at 18.  
 44. Id. 
 45. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co. v. Hearth & Home Techs., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:06-CV-2234, 
2008 WL 2571227, at *7 (M.D. Penn. June 25, 2008). 
 46. See id. at *6-9. 
 47. Id. at *7. 
 48. Id. (quoting Austin v. Nissan Motor Corp., U.S.A., Civ. A. No. 95-1464, 1996 WL 
117472, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 1996)). 
 49. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 615 
(D.N.J. 1997). 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(explaining how the size of the organization contributed to counsel’s difficulty gaining 
compliance with a litigation hold by the organization’s many agents). 
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foreseeable, counsel is responsible for imposing a “litigation hold” on its 
corporate client to “ensure the preservation of relevant documents.”52 As a 
general rule, this hold extends to accessible forms of evidence existing at 
the cusp of litigation as well as evidence that surfaces during litigation.
53
 
The institution of a litigation hold is only the beginning.
54
 Counsel has a 
continuing duty to preserve access to relevant evidence, monitor 
compliance with the hold, and maintain an appropriate level of 
communication with the client.
55
 This ensures “(1) that all relevant 
information (or at least all sources of relevant information) is discovered, 
(2) that relevant information is retained on a continuing basis; and (3) that 
relevant non-privileged material is produced to the opposing party.”56 
The litigation hold is only the tip of the iceberg—counsel then has a 
continuing duty to find and preserve relevant evidence.
57
 This requires 
becoming intimately familiar with the client’s document retention 
policies.
58
 Such knowledge is best taken from the source; key players in the 
litigation as well as agents responsible for the relevant evidence must be 
adequately informed of their continuing duty to preserve it.
59
 “Because 
these ‘key players’ are the ‘employees likely to have relevant 
information,’ it is particularly important that the preservation duty be 
communicated clearly to them [and they] should be periodically reminded 
that the preservation duty is still in place.”60 
The court’s sanctions against the apprentice in Delamirie established the 
adverse inference as a staple of spoliation claims.
61
 And it is no easy 
sanction to elicit from the courts.
62
 Spoliation sanctions are appropriate 
when “(1) a party has a duty to preserve evidence because it knew, or 
should have known, that litigation was imminent, and (2) the adverse party 
was prejudiced by the destruction of the evidence.”63 It is well settled that 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 431. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 432. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id. at 433-34 (quoting Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
 61. Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664, 1 Strange 505 (K.B.). 
 62. Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 63. Id. (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1032 (10th 
Cir. 2007)); see also Jordan F. Miller Corp. v. Mid-Continent Aircraft Serv., No. 97-5089, 
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an adverse inference is appropriate only if the moving party can show bad 
faith.
64
 Mere negligence is not enough.
65
 Failure to prove bad faith 
effectively takes dismissal off the table and compels the court to consider 
softer sanctions.
66
 Courts narrowly tailor sanctions to match the conduct.
67
 
On appeal, a district court’s findings of bad faith or negligence are 
reviewed for clear error, and its decision regarding the extent of sanctions is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
68
  
The district courts have broad discretion to craft a spoliation sanction,
69
 
and they have shown their creativity.
70
 The extent of sanctions, however, 
depends on the severity of the conduct. Outside of involuntary dismissal, an 
adverse inference is the most severe sanction at the court’s disposal.71 The 
conduct receiving an adverse inference must be proportionate to the 
severity of the sanction, and thus, courts generally save dismissal and 
adverse inferences for intentional conduct.
72
 The “bad faith destruction of a 
document [or tangible object] relevant to proof of an issue at trial gives rise 
to an inference that production of the document would have been 
unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction.”73 The conduct must 
also give rise to an inference that the spoliating party likely destroyed 
                                                                                                                 
1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2739, at *13 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 1998) (finding that two primary 
factors control the determination of spoliation sanctions: “(1) the degree of culpability of the 
party who lost or destroyed the evidence, and (2) the degree of actual prejudice to the other 
party”). 
 64. See Turner, 563 F.3d at 1149-50. 
 65. Id. at 1150; see also Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that a showing of bad faith is a prerequisite to awarding an adverse inference 
because negligence “does not support an inference of consciousness of a weak case”). 
 66. Turner, 563 F.3d at 1149. 
 67. See Jordan F. Miller Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2739, at *20-21. 
 68. Turner, 563 F.3d at 1149-50.  
 69. West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 70. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 439-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(ordering the defendant to bear the cost of re-depositions, restoration of documents from 
backup tape, attorney’s fees, and instructing the jury to make an adverse inference on other 
material documents). 
 71. See id. at 437-38. 
 72. Id. at 436-37. Although the district courts have the broad power to effect an outright 
dismissal, they are frugal. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991). A wise use of 
the inherent power seeks to restrict its reach only to the extent of the harm, “vindicat[ing] 
judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court 
and mak[ing] the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy.” 
Id. at 46.  
 73. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997).  
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evidence in an effort to avoid the exposure of what would have inevitably 
been unfavorable information.
74
  
Courts have traditionally used a three-step analysis for determining the 
appropriate sanction.
75
 First, the sanction must be designed 
prophylactically, with the ultimate purpose to deter the conduct.
76
 Second, 
because the spoliator increased the risk of an erroneous judgment, the 
sanction should be formulated to require the spoliator to bear that risk.
77
 
Finally, the sanction should “restore ‘the prejudiced party to the same 
position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence 
by the opposing party.’”78 The United States Supreme Court has established 
that the district courts have discretion to dismiss lawsuits, explaining that 
the inherent powers of the court enable it to craft sanctions necessary to 
effectuate its purposes.
79
 By way of these implied powers, the “Courts of 
justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, 
with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and 
submission to their lawful mandates.”80 These powers are “governed not by 
rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage 
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of 
cases.”81 
While intent drives a large part of the consideration for sanctions, courts 
look to see whether the movant was provided a reasonable opportunity to 
inspect the evidence before it was materially altered. Thus, a plaintiff that 
asserts a breach of contract claim for damage to a machine must give the 
defendants a reasonable opportunity to inspect the subject parts.
82
 In Jordan 
F. Miller Corp., for example, the plaintiff brought a breach of contract 
action when the aircraft it had purchased from the defendant malfunctioned 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Vick v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 75. See West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 79. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991). 
 80. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821); see also Ex parte 
Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874) (holding that “[t]he law happily prescribes the 
punishment which the court can impose for contempts” and can exercise this authority “in 
any cause or hearing before them”). 
 81. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962). 
 82. See Jordan F. Miller Corp. v. Mid-Continent Aircraft Serv., No. 97-5089, 1998 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 2739, at *6 (10th Cir. Feb. 20, 1998) (holding that, prior to making an 
alteration to relevant evidence, the movant was entitled to a hands-on inspection and testing 
of the landing gear).  
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and caused $55,000 in damage.
83
 After the claim was submitted to 
insurance, the aircraft was inspected and the defective parts were removed 
and destroyed.
84
 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that while the plaintiff 
had an opportunity to inspect the aircraft’s components and develop a 
theory of liability ahead of litigation, the defendants had no such 
opportunity.
85
 Finding the defendant’s argument persuasive that a visual, 
hands-on inspection was essential to their defense, the court affirmed the 
sanctions.
86
  
But the duty to provide reasonable inspection is finite.
87
 While the duty 
to preserve arises only when the party “knows or should know that the 
evidence is relevant in imminent or [pending] litigation,”88 a party may 
destroy relevant evidence “after [it] discharges [its] 
duty to preserve evidence by ‘giving the other side notice of a potential 
claim and a full and fair opportunity to inspect relevant evidence.’”89 For an 
inspection to be sufficient, it must occur when the inspecting party 
essentially has constructive notice of litigation.
90
 Otherwise, the inspection 
will be for naught.
91
 
Not all evidence lost prior to or during foreseeable litigation gives rise to 
actionable spoliation—the movant must suffer some material detriment. If 
the court does not find that the moving party was prejudiced as a result of 
the spoliating conduct, then there is no basis for imposing sanctions.
92
 In 
Turner, the plaintiff brought a gender discrimination suit against her 
potential employer, Public Service Company of Colorado (PSCo), after she 
was denied an entry-level position in the company.
93
 During discovery, 
PSCo produced thousands of documents but failed to include the interview 
notes from several of the relevant hiring years.
94
 The plaintiff filed a motion 
to compel in the district court, seeking an adverse inference as a result of 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. at *4-7 
 84. Id. at *6. 
 85. Id. at *19. 
 86. Id. at *20. 
 87. Brassfield v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co, No. CIV-11-1316-F, 2012 WL 12864942, 
at *11 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 13, 2012). 
 88. Id. at *8 (quoting Jordan F. Miller Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2739, at *5). 
 89. Miller v. Lankow, 801 N.W.2d 120, 129 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Golke, 768 N.W.2d 729, 737 (Wis. 2009)).  
 90. Id.  
 91. See id.  
 92. See Turner v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 563 F.3d 1136, 1150 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 93. Id. at 1140-42. 
 94. Id. at 1148. 
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the missing interview notes.
95
 Characterizing her argument as a “spoliation 
of evidence” claim, the district court granted summary judgment for PSCo, 
citing the plaintiff’s failure to prove bad faith.96 On appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit scolded the plaintiff for failing to assert Rule 37 sanctions and 
returned a decision for PSCo, explaining that there was no evidence that the 
plaintiff was “actually, rather than merely theoretically” prejudiced by its 
loss.
97
 In addition, the court pointed to the myriad other interview-related 
documents, as well as the deposition of her interviewer, as evidence tending 
show a lack of bad faith.
98
 As a result, summary judgment was affirmed.
99
 
In order to effectuate the power of the federal courts, parties with viable 
spoliation claims are advised to seek sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37.
100
 A party who is not “diligent in the defense of [its] own 
interests” and fails to invoke Rule 37 to remedy the alleged prejudice 
“forecloses access to the substantial weaponry in the district court’s 
arsenal” and leaves sanctions under a “spoliation of evidence” theory as the 
only remaining option.
101
 Rule 37(a), in relevant part, allows a party to 
“move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery” and “include a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to 
confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an 
effort to obtain it without court action.”102 If a court order to compel 
disclosure or inspection is ignored or obstructed, subsection (b) provides 
that: 
If a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent—or a 
witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails to 
obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order 
under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the action is 
pending may issue further just orders.
103
 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 1148-49 (quotation marks omitted). 
 96. See id. at 1149. 
 97. See id. at 1150. 
 98. Id.; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1032-33 
(10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that the removal and destruction of waste on 
his property constituted actionable spoliation because the parties had “generated extensive 
documentation of the condition of the land before and during remediation”). 
 99. Turner, 563 F.3d at 1150.  
 100. Id. at 1149. 
 101. Id. (quoting Mathis v. John Morden Buick, Inc., 136 F.3d 1153, 1155-56 (7th Cir. 
1998)). 
 102. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1). 
 103. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). 
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The Rule also provides that failure to respond to a request for inspection 
can itself justify sanctions, stating that the court may order sanctions if “a 
party, after being properly served with interrogatories under Rule 33 or a 
request for inspection under Rule 34, fails to serve its answers, objections, 
or written response.”104 
B. Spoliation in Other Jurisdictions 
The complexity of the Duty Dilemma becomes evident when cast in 
terms of non-Oklahoma spoliation law.
105
 In contract actions, Oklahoma 
adheres to a choice of law rule that states “the nature, validity and 
interpretation of a contract is governed by the law where the contract is 
made.”106 However, it is only where a contract is silent as to the applicable 
state law that the rule arises.
107
 This is codified in title 15, section 162 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes.
108
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has established that 
the state substantive law specified in a contract will control “as long as the 
selected law is not contrary to Oklahoma’s established public policy.”109 
And a particular state law may be selected either explicitly or implicitly in a 
contract.
110
 Thus, it is important to understand the variety of approaches to 
spoliation and how they depart from the Oklahoma approach.  
Suppose a contract specifies that New York law controls. Further, 
assume there is nothing about this choice of law provision that offends the 
public policy goals of Oklahoma—the location where the bulk of the 
contract was performed. In contrast to Oklahoma’s approach, New York 
                                                                                                                 
 104. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(ii). 
 105. See, e.g., Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 
1986) (finding, contrary to Oklahoma, an independent action for spoliation); Holmes v. 
Amerex Rent–A–Car, 710 A.2d 846, 849 (D.C. 1998) (finding that the same may be found, 
given proper circumstances); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 
1993) ( “A cause of action exists in tort for interference with or destruction of 
evidence . . . .”). 
 106. Bohannan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1991 OK 64, ¶ 17, 820 P.2d 787, 793; see also Telex 
Corp. v. Hamilton, 1978 OK 32, ¶ 8, 576 P.2d 767, 768 (“[T]he general rule of law is that 
the law where the contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature, validity, 
and interpretation.”). 
 107. SFF-TIR, LLC v. Stephenson, 250 F. Supp. 3d 856, 972 (N.D. Okla. 2017). 
 108. See 15 OKLA. STAT. § 162 (2011). 
 109. Stephenson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 973; see also Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Shear, 
1990 OK 67, ¶ 6 & n.12, 796 P.2d 296, 299 & n.12 (finding that a choice of law provision is 
invalid if the chosen law violates a fundamental policy of a state with a greater interest in the 
issue, and that state’s law would govern absent the choice of law provision). 
 110. Stephenson, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 973. 
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has entertained independent causes of action in tort for spoliation.
111
 Under 
New York law, the tort of intentional spoliation is established by showing 
(1) pending or imminent litigation; (2) that the plaintiff-buyer had 
knowledge of the pending or imminent litigation; (3) willful destruction of 
evidence or destruction designed to frustrate the defendant-seller’s case; (4) 
actual disruption of the case; and (5) the plaintiff-buyer’s acts proximately 
caused the seller’s damages.112  
Negligent spoliation follows the typical duty-breach-damage model.
113
 
The cause of action must evidence “(1) the existence of a duty on 
defendant’s part as to plaintiff; (2) a breach of this duty; and (3) injury to 
the plaintiff as a result thereof.”114 Many courts look to the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals to articulate a negligent spoliation action, which 
requires the moving party to prove (1) that litigation is either pending or 
reasonably foreseeable; (2) the plaintiff-buyer had actual knowledge of the 
pending or imminent litigation; (3) “a duty to preserve evidence arising 
from a contract, agreement, statute, administrative rule, voluntary 
assumption of duty, or other special circumstances;” (4) spoliation of the 
evidence; (5) the evidence that was spoliated by the plaintiff-buyer was 
essential to the defendant-seller’s defense in the pending or imminent 
action; and (6) damages.
115
  
Although a handful of states have recognized an independent action in 
tort for breaching the duty to preserve evidence, most refuse to 
acknowledge it. The Tenth Circuit—and Oklahoma specifically—joins the 
majority.
116
 States that have refused to adopt a cause of action in tort for 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Compare Fada Indus. v. Falchi Bldg. Co., L.P., 730 N.Y.S.2d 827, 840-41 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2001) (holding that both intentional and negligent spoliation can be brought in tort), 
with MetLife Auto & Home v. Joe Basil Chevrolet, Inc., 753 N.Y.S.2d 272, 279 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2002) (holding that independent actions in tort for spoliation contain too many pitfalls 
and are prone to abuse). 
 112. Fada Indus., 730 N.Y.S.2d at 840. 
 113. See Ortega v. City of New York, 876 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (N.Y. 2007). 
 114. Fada Indus., 730 N.Y.S.2d at 841. 
 115. Ortega, 876 N.E.2d at 1193-94 (quoting Hannah v. Heeter, 584 S.E.2d 560, 569 (W. 
Va. 2003)). 
 116. See, e.g., Estate of Trentadue ex rel. Aguilar v. United States, 397 F.3d 840, 862 
(10th Cir. 2005) (finding that Oklahoma does not recognize an independent tort for negligent 
spoliation); cf. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986) 
(recognizing the tort of “intentional interference with prospective civil action by spoliation 
of evidence”); Smith v. Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993) 
(recognizing a cause of action against primary and third parties for spoliation); Patel v. 
OMH Med. Ctr., Inc., 1999 OK 33, ¶ 46, 987 P.2d 1185, 1202 (“[M]ost of the courts which 
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spoliation have done so for a number of reasons.
117
 First, they have a 
variety of alternative mechanisms by which to deter and compensate for 
spoliation, including discovery sanctions and adverse inferences.
118
 Second, 
it is not uncommon for third parties to be the perpetrators of alleged 
spoliation, thereby complicating the apportionment of fault.
119
 Third, and 
consistently cited, an independent cause of action in tort interferes with an 
individual’s right to dispose his property how he chooses, bringing an 
individual and his property within the purview of the court’s enforcement 
power.
120
 Finally, courts explain that an independent tort would likely fail 
to recognize exigent circumstances demanding the disposition of the 
property, not least of which may include compelling safety justifications.
121
  
Recognition of an independent tort also raises a poignant procedural 
issue.
122
 Despite a general agreement amongst state and federal courts on its 
negative implications, it is unsettled whether a claimant must bring and lose 
the underlying suit before asserting an independent spoliation claim or 
whether the two claims should be brought in the same action.
123
 For some, 
the issue is one of collateral estoppel.
124
 However, others suggest that once 
the merits of the underlying civil action have been ascertained, and the 
extent of prejudice caused by the spoliation is revealed, the operative facts 
regarding a subsequent action for intentional spoliation are substantially 
                                                                                                                 
have considered the issue have refused to recognize spoliation as an independent cause of 
action in tort.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Foster v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 809 F. Supp. 831, 837 (D. Kan. 1992) 
(listing six reasons why courts refuse to recognize an independent tort). 
 118. See e.g., id.; Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. La. 
1992) (noting that an adverse presumption was a sufficient sanction against the spoliator); 
Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362, 365 (D. Mass. 1991) (deciding to exclude 
the evidence rather than dismiss the case and applying these five factors: “(1) whether the 
defendant was prejudiced as a result of the [unilateral inspection by the plaintiff]; (2) 
whether the prejudice can be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether 
the plaintiff was in good faith or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if the evidence is 
not excluded”). 
 119. See Foster, 809 F. Supp at 837. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. at 837-38. Compare Kent v. Costruzione Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, 
S.p.A., CIV. A. No. 90–2233, 1990 WL 139414, at *7 n.12 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 1990) (“Not 
until there is a disposition with respect to the underlying civil action can it be determined 
whether the destruction of evidence has prejudiced plaintiff.”) with Smith v. Super. Ct., 198 
Cal. Rptr. 829, 837 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that a spoliation action should be heard in 
conjunction with the underlying claim). 
 124. Kent, 1990 WL 139414, at *7 n.12.  
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different—thus, collateral estoppel is not a bar.125 Nevertheless, many 
remain skeptical and insist that a spoliation claim should be juxtaposed 
alongside the underlying claim in order to prevent “needless duplication of 
effort” and reproduction of the same evidence in subsequent litigation.126  
To illustrate the utility of an independent tort for spoliation, courts have 
distinguished a “first-party” and “third-party” action.127 Whereas “[t]hird-
party spoliation refers to spoliation by a non-party” to the principal 
litigation,
128
 a first-party spoliator “is a party to the underlying action who 
has destroyed or suppressed evidence relevant to the plaintiff’s claims 
against [that] party.”129 The key distinction is that a third-party spoliator is 
“not alleged to have committed the underlying tort as to which the lost or 
destroyed evidence related.”130 Jurisdictions that recognize independent 
actions for spoliation have found that such actions are necessary to pin 
liability on third parties that would otherwise be beyond reach.
131
 They are 
designed to fill the “open space in the law where a plaintiff otherwise 
would be left without a remedy.”132  
Even outside of Oklahoma, protecting the moving party’s right to inspect 
the evidence and prepare a defense for trial is the fundamental purpose of 
spoliation sanctions.
133
 In Kirkland, the plaintiff’s sued the New York City 
Housing Authority (NYCHA) and a stove manufacturer when an allegedly 
defective stove caused the plaintiff’s death.134 NYCHA impleaded a third-
party defendant and subsequently had the stove removed from the unit.
135
 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. 
 126. See, e.g., Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 837. 
 127. Cook v. Children’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., 810 F. Supp. 2d 151, 157 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing 
Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 710 A.2d 846, 848-49 (D.C. 1998)). 
 128. Howard Reg'l Health Sys. v. Gordon, 952 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Ind. 2011). 
 129. Mendez v. Hovensa, L.L.C., Civil No. 02–0169, 2008 WL 803115, at *7 (D. V.I. 
Mar. 24, 2008) (quoting Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 905 A.2d 1165, 1173 n.5 (Conn. 
2006)). 
 130. Id. at *7 n.1 (quoting Rizzuto, 905 A.2d at 1173 n.5).  
 131. Cook, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 157-588. 
 132. Id. at 157 (citing Holmes, 710 A.2d at 849). The court in Holmes went on to explain 
that “[b]ecause sanctions may not be levied upon a disinterested, independent third party, an 
independent tort action for negligent spoliation of evidence is the only means to deter the 
negligent destruction of evidence and to compensate the aggrieved party for its destruction.” 
Holmes, 710 A.2d at 849 (quoting John K. Stipancich, Comment, The Negligent Spoliation 
of Evidence: An Independent Tort Action May Be the Only Acceptable Alternative, 53 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1135, 1141-42 (1992)). 
 133. See Kirkland v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 666 N.Y.S.2d 609, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
 134. Id. at 610. 
 135. Id. 
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There was no evidence that NYCHA had made any attempt to preserve the 
evidence, and dismissal of the third-party claim was therefore deemed an 
appropriate sanction.
136
 However, the court emphasized an important 
principle:
137
 The purpose of sanctioning the spoliation of evidence, whether 
intentional or negligent, is to encourage future litigants to apprise offended 
parties of the evidence, give them an opportunity to inspect it, and form 
their defense.
138
  
In situations like these, sanctions are appropriate only “inasmuch as 
[they] leave[] the offended party prejudicially bereft of appropriate means 
to confront a claim with incisive evidence and turns trials into speculative 
spectacles based on rank ‘swearing contests.’”139 The Kirkland court 
ultimately resolved the spoliation issue against NYCHA because its 
disposal of the stove made it unavailable for critical examination and 
analysis by the third party defendant.
140
 NYCHA, as it turned out, had 
failed to make its own inspection for the six years after the action’s 
commencement.
141
 The failure to avail itself of the evidence was, in effect, 
“a problem of its own making.”142 For a party bearing the burden to prove 
spoliation, “[t]he gravamen of th[e] burden is a showing of prejudice.”143  
Prejudice is a steep burden to show.
144
 It requires the moving party to 
demonstrate that the absence of the evidence “fatally compromise[s] the 
defense . . . or leave[s] the [party] without the means to defend the 
action.”145 In Kirschen, for example, the tenant of an apartment unit filed 
suit against the defendants for allegedly causing damage to his apartment.
146
 
Before commencing the action, the plaintiff renovated and dramatically 
changed portions of the unit that had allegedly been damaged by the 
defendants.
147
 The defendants retorted that this conduct amounted to 
spoliation of the evidence, but the court held that the plaintiff’s acts of 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. at 611. 
 137. See id. at 612. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. at 612 (quoting Hoenig, Products Liability: Impeachment 
Exception; Spoliation Update, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1993, at 6). 
 140. Id. at 612. 
 141. Id. at 613. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Kirschen v. Marino, 792 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. (quoting Favish v. Tepler, 741 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)). 
 146. Id. at 171. 
 147. Id.  
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renovating the apartment were not enough to support a spoliation claim.
148
 
The defendants could not prove that they were significantly prejudiced by 
the alteration of the disputed portions of the unit because “[b]oth the 
plaintiff and the defendants had numerous photographs of the apartment” in 
its prior state.
149
 The court noted that the defendants were uniquely 
positioned, as the prior tenants, “to testify to their version of [the unit’s] 
condition at the time they vacated.”150 Ultimately, the circumstances were 
insufficient to demonstrate severe prejudice to the presentation of a 
defense.
151
  
C. The Duty to Mitigate Damages 
The United States Supreme Court set forth the modern duty to mitigate 
in Warren v. Stoddart, a breach of contract action concerning the credit 
terms of a book order.
152
 In Warren, the court explained that when a buyer 
expects to receive the benefit of a contract, “and can save himself from a 
loss arising from a breach of it at a trifling expense or with reasonable 
exertions, it is his duty to do it, and he can charge the delinquent with such 
damages only as with reasonable endeavors and expense he could not 
prevent.”153 Thus, a buyer must make reasonable efforts to mitigate his 
injury when the seller breaches a material element of a contract of sale.
154
 
He will not be allowed to recover an amount beyond what his reasonable 
efforts would have avoided had he made such efforts.
155
 Under typical 
pleading standards, the defendant in an action has the burden of pleading 
duty to mitigate as an affirmative defense.
156
 The analysis employs a 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Id. at 172. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 172-73. 
 152. Warren v. Stoddart, 105 U.S. 224, 229 (1881). 
 153. Id.; see, e.g., Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1867). 
 154. See, e.g., United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf Holdings Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1231 
(10th Cir. 2000) (noting that the defendant has the burden of asserting and proving 
mitigation of damages as an affirmative defense); Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N.Y. 72, 76-
77 (1863) (“Damages for breaches of contract are only those which are incidental to, and 
directly caused by, the breach, and may reasonably be presumed to have entered into the 
contemplation of the parties; and not speculative profits, or accidental or consequential 
losses.”); Bailey v. J.L. Roebuck Co., 1929 OK 96, ¶ 3, 275 P. 329, 330 (restating the 
principle of mitigation). 
 155. Bailey, ¶ 3, 275 P. at 330. 
 156. Oklahoma law, for example, suggests that the burden of proving that damages 
should have been less is on the defendant. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Grant, 505 
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reasonableness test.
157
 Therefore, where a seller has materially breached a 
contract, it is the obligation of the buyer to “render his injury as light as 
possible.”158 He may not recover any amount that would have been avoided 
had he simply acted as a reasonably prudent person faced with similar 
circumstances.
159
 
The duty to mitigate takes on different hues depending on the timing of 
the mitigating conduct.
160
 When the buyer’s negligent conduct occurs after 
the seller has already committed an actionable breach of contract, the 
buyer’s failure to mitigate damages is labeled “avoidable consequences.”161 
On the other hand, negligent conduct that occurs prior to the seller’s 
actionable breach, and contributes to the commission of the breach, is 
“contributory negligence.”162 This type of negligent conduct by the buyer is 
of the sort that, taken together with the seller’s negligent conduct, is the 
proximate cause of the buyer’s injury.163 Avoidable consequences and 
contributory negligence both refer to the negligent conduct of the buyer but 
manifest themselves at different points in the causal timeline. When the 
seller of a defective machine breaches the sale contract, the buyer must take 
reasonable precautions to prevent causing additional damage.
164
 Any 
                                                                                                                 
F.3d 1013, 1028 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that Oklahoma state law requires defendants to 
carry the burden under the diminution of value rule).  
 157. Sackett v. Rose, 1916 OK 2, ¶ 14, 154 P. 1177, 1180 (“The question in such cases is 
always whether the necessary acts to mitigate the damages were reasonable, having regard to 
all the circumstances of the particular case.”).  
 158. Id. (quoting Uhlig v. Barnum, 61 N.W. 749 (Neb. 1895). 
 159. Id. (quoting Uhlig, 61 N.W. 749). 
 160. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1230 (D.N.M. 
2004) (emphasizing that the theory of avoidable consequences concerns the mitigation of 
damages that arise after the commission of a tort or a breach of contract (quoting Acme 
Cigarette Servs. v. Gallegos, 577 P.2d 885, 891 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978))); see also W. PAGE 
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 458 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th 
ed. 1984) (“The rule of avoidable consequences comes into play after a legal wrong has 
occurred, but while some damages may still be averted, and bars recovery only for such 
damages.”). 
 161. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (quoting Gallegos, 577 P.2d at 891 
(Hernandez, J., specially concurring)).  
 162. Thomason v. Pilger, 2005 OK 10, ¶ 10, 112 P.3d 1162, 1166. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Leigh King Forstman, Mitigating Damages: Reasonable Versus Unreasonable 
Actions (Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am. Winter 2004 Convention Reference Materials, Feb. 
2004), Westlaw WINTER2004 ATLA-CLE 269 ("Regardless of how the injury occurred or 
whose negligence caused the injury, the plaintiff must take reasonable steps after being 
injured; if not, the plaintiff's recovery can be barred or reduced if the plaintiff's conduct is 
deemed unreasonable."). 
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damage caused by the buyer’s failure to take such precautions is 
unrecoverable.
165
 As a result, the hypothetical buyer B has a compelling 
reason to salvage the hydraulic equipment on his new disc—failure to do so 
may prevent him from recovering any losses caused by his failure to timely 
salvage the parts and commence work before the weather turns sour.  
The duty to mitigate is not exclusively the stuff of torts.
166
 Such a duty 
also arises in breach of contract actions.
167
 Moreover, when circumstances 
compel a plaintiff to mitigate damages, “it is the choice of the Plaintiff, not 
the Defendant[], as to which remedies the Plaintiff will seek.”168 When the 
choice of one remedy over another is the product of business judgment, 
courts afford deference because they “cannot willingly dictate to a business 
what the wise and prudent course of action would be.”169 Thus, when the 
defendant-seller objects to the remedy chosen by the injured buyer, courts 
are quick to quip, “[T]he person whose wrong forced the choice cannot 
complain that one rather than the other was chosen.”170 An aggrieved party 
is not required to exalt the interests of the breaching party merely to 
appease its hypocritical distaste for the plaintiff’s mitigation preference.171  
Adding further complexity to the Duty Dilemma is the last clear chance 
doctrine—the ancestral cousin of the duty to mitigate.172 Although it 
addresses problems of proximate cause, the doctrine serves as a useful 
guide for non-traditional duty dilemmas—the type where the plaintiff-buyer 
is the alleged spoliator.
173
 It was developed to acknowledge the principle 
“that the law holds liable for injury those who are responsible for the 
                                                                                                                 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d at 1230 (quoting Gallegos, 577 P.2d at 891 
(Hernandez, J., specially concurring)). 
 167. Id.; see also Hidalgo Props., Inc. v. Wachovia Mortg. Co., 617 F.2d 196, 200 (10th 
Cir. 1980); Gallegos, 577 P.2d at 891 (Hernandez, J., specially concurring) (“It is well 
settled that a party must use reasonable diligence to mitigate the damages about to be 
suffered either from tort or breach of contract.” (citing Mitchell v. Jones, 138 P.2d 522, 524 
(N.M. 1943))). 
 168. Walshe v. Zabors, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1086-87 (D. Colo. 2016) (“[T]he choice of 
remedies belongs to the one who has been defrauded, and may not be forced upon him by 
the wrongdoer.” (citing H & K Auto. Supply Co. v. Moore & Co., 657 P.2d 986, 988 (Colo. 
App. 1982))). 
 169. In re WPRV-TV, Inc., 102 B.R. 231, 234 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1988). 
 170. Id. (quoting In re Kellett Aircraft Corp., 186 F.2d 197, 198–99 (3d Cir. 1950)). 
 171. Id. (quoting Kellett, 186 F.2d at 199). 
 172. See Okla. Ry. Co. v. Overton, 1932 OK 353, ¶ 7, 12 P.2d 537, 538 (quoting Pa. R.R. 
v. Swartzel, 17 F.2d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 1927)).  
 173. See id. 
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proximate cause of the injury.”174 Nevertheless, the doctrine speaks to 
situations where a party, not initially privy to another’s negligent conduct, 
finds himself in a position where injury to the other can be avoided by his 
own reasonable conduct.
175
 Put another way, when party X finds party Y “in 
a place of danger” resulting from Y’s own negligent conduct, and X has the 
“last clear chance” to prevent Y from incurring harm, X must use ordinary 
care to prevent that harm.
176
 It is irrelevant how Y found himself in danger; 
the doctrine notes that X’s failure to use ordinary care to prevent Y’s injury 
is the proximate cause of Y’s injury.177 Although the doctrine was embraced 
as an answer to specific problems of proximate cause in complex causation 
fact patterns, it provides a unique lens through which to view the Duty 
Dilemma. 
III. Which Court? The Procedural Problem with Spoliation 
State choice-of-law rules dictate the legal risk landscape between 
contracting parties.
178
 This is because each choice-of-law determination is 
based largely upon the parties’ expectations regarding the contract and how 
its choice-of-law clause will apply.
179
 Thus, the essential inquiry in choice-
of-law questions is whether the issue is substantive or procedural.
180
 Parties 
are “empowered to make contractual choice-of-law provisions,” and as a 
result, the expectation of the parties regarding the applicability of those 
provisions is “a significant factor in the determination of whether an issue is 
substantive or procedural for choice-of-law purposes.”181 
Accordingly, the Erie Doctrine is deeply embedded in spoliation 
doctrine.
182
 It is well settled that a federal court sitting in diversity applies 
the substantive law of the forum state,
183
 but there is disagreement among 
the courts as to whether spoliation is a substantive or procedural issue.
184
 If 
spoliation is conclusively procedural in nature, the Erie Doctrine requires 
                                                                                                                 
 174. Id.  
 175. See id.  
 176. Id.  
 177. Id.  
 178. See Boyd Rosene & Assocs., Inc. v. Kan. Mun. Gas Agency, 174 F.3d 1115, 1126 
(10th Cir. 1999).  
 179. Id.  
 180. Id.  
 181. Id.  
 182. See Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 127 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 183. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 184. See generally KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 18. 
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that federal courts in diversity apply federal procedural rules.
185
 However, 
making a proper distinction between “substance” and “procedure” can 
present a daunting task, as “[t]he line between [the two] shifts as the legal 
context changes.”186 The majority of circuits, however, hold that spoliation 
is procedural in nature and apply federal law for spoliation sanctions.
187
  
The law of spoliation is primarily considered procedural because it draws 
upon the inherent powers of the courts. In Adkins, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that federal law prevailed in spoliation cases because the 
authority to impose sanctions for spoliated evidence arises “from a court’s 
inherent power to control the judicial process,” rather than from the forum 
state’s substantive law.188 Also, a spoliation determination is inherently 
evidentiary in nature, and federal courts generally apply their own 
evidentiary principles in diversity.
189
 Where the bad faith of a litigant is in 
question and the imposition of sanctions is looming, such a determination 
“reaches a court’s inherent power to police itself” and brings it within the 
purview of federal law.
190
 Of course, if a federal court determines that the 
outcome would be the same whether federal or state law is used, the choice 
of law analysis is inconsequential.
191
 
Conversely, some courts have held that the pre-litigation duty to preserve 
evidence is substantive.
192
 In State Farm, a defective dishwasher was 
alleged to be the proximate cause of a fire.
193
 The court found that State 
Farm breached its duty to preserve material evidence when it allowed the 
dishwasher to be destroyed, and ordered the exclusion of all evidence 
related to the dishwasher.
194
 Relying on Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, a key 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). 
 186. Id. at 471. 
 187. See, e.g., Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 2009); Silvestri v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2001) (applying the federal law of spoliation 
despite the fact that both parties agreed that the law of New York—where the incident 
occurred—applied). 
 188. 554 F.3d at 652 (quoting Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 590). 
 189. King v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 337 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 190. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991); Peshlakai v. Ruiz, 39 F. 
Supp. 3d 1264, 1343 (D.N.M. 2014) (noting that the Tenth Circuit has not directly addressed 
whether federal law governs spoliation issues and deciding to err with the majority). 
 191. See KOESEL & TURNBULL, supra note 18. 
 192. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160, 162 (N.D. Ill. 
1992). 
 193. Id. at 161. 
 194. Id. at 163. 
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component of the Erie doctrine, the State Farm court found that the duty to 
preserve evidence is substantive, and therefore applied Illinois state law.
195
  
Because allegations of spoliation in the context of the Duty Dilemma 
generally point to conduct that occurred prior to litigation, the court’s 
sanctioning power must extend to the pre-commencement period if 
spoliation is to be treated as procedural. Without a court order or pending 
discovery request, the court’s authority to police itself is potentially limited. 
Reaching early-stage spoliation may require the courts to enter the 
substantive realm. If, however, courts can maintain that the power to police 
itself extends to that period when litigation is reasonably foreseeable, then a 
procedural classification of spoliation remains defensible. 
Thus, the substantive problem of spoliation: if a jurisdiction does not 
recognize an independent duty to preserve evidence, must it conclude that 
spoliation is purely procedural? The refusal to recognize a tort action for 
failure to preserve evidence may infer that the courts’ ability to police itself 
is limited to conduct already within the purview of litigation. Such a result 
would further complicate the Duty Dilemma, especially where the plaintiff 
is the spoliator. Because the plaintiff-buyer brings suit and is the first to 
reasonably foresee litigation, the law, as it is, would require the defendant 
to get a court order against the buyer when litigation hasn’t even 
commenced yet. This absurdity illustrates the choice of law issue. For 
spoliation to be procedural, the courts must have clear authority to police 
the conduct. If the circumstances appear to limit the courts’ authority—
because the conduct occurred before the matter was brought within the 
court’s jurisdiction—then that form of spoliation may warrant substantive 
treatment. Resolving the choice of law problem is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, but it is important to note that the Duty Dilemma presents 
spoliation in a context that may demand substantive rather than procedural 
classification. Regardless, the applicable law governing the spoliation claim 
will turn on the choice of law classification, and the Duty Dilemma must be 
resolved just the same.  
IV. Mariposa Farms and the Unresolved Duty Dilemma 
A plaintiff-buyer may successfully invoke the “duty to mitigate” as a 
defense to spoliation as long as the spoliator gives the moving party a 
sufficient opportunity to inspect the evidence prior to making an 
                                                                                                                 
 195. Id. at 162. 
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alteration.
196
 In Mariposa, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged deficiencies in a 
cow-milking system manufactured by the defendants, and brought an action 
for financial losses resulting from the equipment’s failure to function 
properly.
197
 After the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff significantly 
altered the system in response to an expert’s recommendations, hoping to 
make it operational. These alterations occurred nearly six weeks after they 
were recommended, but at no point was the defendant provided an 
opportunity to inspect the system itself.
198
 The court, frowning upon the 
plaintiff’s conduct, reasoned that its unilateral alterations deprived the 
defendant of the opportunity to “gather direct evidence with which to 
support its defense,” thereby preventing it from formulating an argument 
for trial that it otherwise would have been able to make.
199
  
It is important to note, however, that the plaintiff preserved the parts and 
major components of the milking system, took photographs of the 
alterations, and directed its own expert to test the system before the 
change.
200
 Nevertheless, the court held that this was not enough to avoid a 
spoliation sanction.
201
 “[S]uch evidence,” it held, “is insufficient to preserve 
[defendant’s] right to inspect and to have its own expert test the system as it 
existed prior to any alterations being made.”202  
The plaintiff rebutted the defendant’s subsequent spoliation claim by 
arguing that the alterations were made in performance of its duty to mitigate 
                                                                                                                 
 196. See Mariposa Farms, LLC v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., No. CIV 03-0779 JC/LAM, 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49951, at *9 (D.N.M. Feb. 3, 2005). 
 197. Id. at *4-5. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at *6-7. 
 200. Id. at *7. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id.; see also Barnett v. Simmons, 2008 OK 100, ¶ 19, 197 P.3d 12, 19 (finding that 
“an examination reasonably foreseeably destructive of evidence done without notice to 
opposing counsel which does result in destruction of evidence should expose a party to 
severe sanction” (citing Holm-Waddle v. Hawley, 1998 OK 53, ¶ 10, 967 P.2d 1180, 1182)). 
Addressing a plaintiff-buyer’s own use of an expert, the court in Holm-Waddle stated that: 
When an expert employed by a party or his attorney conducts an examination 
reasonably foreseeably destructive without notice to opposing counsel and such 
examination results in either negligent or intentional destruction of evidence, 
thereby rendering it impossible for an opposing party to obtain a fair trial; it 
appears that the Court would not only be empowered, but required to take 
appropriate action, either to dismiss the suit altogether, or to ameliorate the ill-
gotten advantage. 
Holm-Waddle, ¶ 10, 967 P.2d at 1182 (quoting Barker v. Bledsoe, 85 F.R.D. 545, 547-48 
(W.D. Okla. 1979)).  
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damages.
203
 The court rejected this argument, stating that the plaintiff’s 
“duty to mitigate damages and its duty to preserve evidence [were] not 
mutually exclusive.”204 It further reasoned that the plaintiff could have 
mitigated damages while still allowing the defendant to inspect the system 
before it was changed.
205
 In response, the plaintiff argued that the 
defendant’s personnel who visited the dairy farm before the alterations were 
made to the milking system had ample opportunity to inspect it on those 
visits.
206
 The court rejected this argument as well, stating that the personnel 
visits were for routine service and maintenance rather than for litigation 
purposes.
207
  
Because the plaintiff could not show that the defendant should have 
known to use these visits to inspect and test the system prior to impending 
litigation and alterations, the mitigation defense was denied.
208
 
Nevertheless, the timing of the alterations was a significant factor in the 
court’s decision.209 Because the alterations occurred after the suit was 
commenced rather than before, the court noted that spoliation that occurs 
after commencement is inherently more blameworthy.
210
  
The court also resolved the prejudice element of the spoliation analysis 
against the plaintiff.
211
 Although the plaintiff had kept the component parts, 
the court found that the complexity of the milking system required that it be 
maintained in its original state to facilitate a fair inspection by the 
defendant.
212
 Ultimately, the alterations to the milking system “depriv[ed] 
[the defendant] of direct, objective and independent evidence of the vacuum 
pressure in the system prior to the modification.”213 Despite the severity of 
the plaintiff’s spoliation, the court chose to exclude the evidence rather than 
dismiss the suit.
214
  
This is the first and only case in the Tenth Circuit to visit—albeit in an 
unpublished opinion—the competing duties issue. Although it purports to 
resolve the conflict by pronouncing them not mutually exclusive, its 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Mariposa Farms, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49951, at *9. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See id. 
 210. Id. at *9-10. 
 211. Id. at *10-12. 
 212. Id. at *10. 
 213. Id. at *11. 
 214. Id. at *13. 
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holding leaves many aspects of spoliation and tort law largely unexplored. 
The time is ripe to resolve the Duty Dilemma.  
Whether or not an independent action for spoliation exists, the buyer of a 
defective machine has a duty to preserve evidence as soon as litigation 
becomes reasonably foreseeable.
215
 This is especially true of a plaintiff-
spoliator who is the first party to know that litigation is in fact on the 
horizon. Once the buyer discovers that the machine is defective, it will 
presumably begin the process of rectifying the transaction, giving notice to 
the seller and scheduling necessary repairs. Notice is essential. If the 
plaintiff-buyer does not provide the seller with an adequate opportunity to 
inspect the defective machine, thereby failing to give the seller a sufficient 
reason to believe that litigation is on the horizon, the prejudice element of 
the spoliation claim will be almost automatic. 
The duty to mitigate and the duty to preserve evidence are not mutually 
exclusive. However, the burden is on the plaintiff-buyer to provide the 
seller an adequate opportunity to inspect the evidence because it is the 
plaintiff-buyer that controls whether breach of contract litigation will 
commence. Refer back to the original hypothetical. Spoliation and 
mitigation issues collide in unique circumstances. When buyer B discovers 
that the disc he bought from seller S is defective, there is a small window 
for either party to make necessary repairs. Remember, the weather—and in 
other cases, the economy—is a limiting factor that affects whether B has 
time to seek repairs and whether S has time to perform them. Therefore, B 
must be wary. A strategic miscalculation resulting in the disposal or 
alteration of the disc before S has had time to inspect it will likely result in a 
spoliation sanction—and B’s duty-to-mitigate defense will fail under 
Mariposa.  
Therefore, the underlying theme of the Duty Dilemma is that the duty to 
mitigate only becomes a viable defense if it was in fact reasonable for B to 
mitigate its damages. Because reasonableness informs the duty to mitigate, 
it must also inform the Duty Dilemma. The opportunity to inspect is the key 
determinant. Whether it was reasonable for B to mitigate its economic 
damages by altering and repurposing the hydraulic system on the new disc 
will depend on whether S’s opportunity to inspect the disc—prior to 
alteration—was sufficient to allow it to form a defense for future litigation.  
Borrowing from long-standing tort law, the plaintiff-buyer who finds 
itself wrestling with the Duty Dilemma has the last clear chance to avoid a 
                                                                                                                 
 215. See Henning v. Union Pac. R.R., 530 F.3d 1206, 1220 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 505 F.3d 1013, 1032 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
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spoliation issue. And the duty not to spoliate implies an underlying duty to 
provide for a proper inspection of the evidence. As long as the seller has 
had a reasonable opportunity to inspect, the showing of prejudice will fail 
and spoliation will be rendered a non-issue. As a result, the burden is on the 
buyer to provide a legally sufficient opportunity to inspect. What exactly 
does this look like? The case law analyzing inspection requirements 
through the spoliation lens suggests that the opportunity to inspect is best 
characterized as an opportunity to develop a defense for litigation.
216
 In the 
competing duties context, this must give the inspecting party reasonable 
notice that the inspection should be performed with future litigation in 
mind.  
There are several types of inspection that, despite substantial compliance 
and cooperation by the plaintiff-buyer, fail to apprise the seller of 
impending litigation. An inspection performed in the normal course of 
business, perhaps according to routine maintenance obligations stipulated in 
the contract of sale, may not give rise to the level of notice necessary to 
constitute proper notice. Suppose the sale contract between B and S requires 
that S perform routine maintenance inspections each quarter and conduct 
necessary repairs. It will be inappropriate for B to characterize one of these 
routine inspections as an adequate inspection for spoliation purposes. The 
determinative question is whether the opportunity for inspection is 
sufficient to inform the inspector of impending litigation and provide a 
meaningful opportunity to collect information necessary to support its 
argument at trial. Relying on a mere routine inspection to notify the seller 
of impending litigation, without more, is not enough to place the possibility 
of litigation within the reasonable foreseeability of the defendant-seller. 
It is important to keep in mind that the essential element of spoliation is 
prejudice to the moving party.
217
 Prejudice is generally cast in terms of lack 
of access to evidence—causing the defendant to botch its defense for 
trial.
218
 Underlying every spoliation claim is an inherent causation element. 
But for the lack of access to relevant evidence, the seller would have been 
able to effectively controvert the allegations of the breach of contract 
action. In the Duty Dilemma context, the duty to mitigate damages coopts 
the “adequacy of inspection” issue. Suppose B does not salvage the parts 
                                                                                                                 
 216. See Kirkland v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 666 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) 
(holding that the purpose of inspections is to provide an opportunity for the inspecting party 
to form the defense it would have been able to make had the evidence been preserved). 
 217. Kirschen v. Marino, 792 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (noting that “the 
gravamen of [a spoliation claim] is a showing of prejudice”). 
 218. Id. 
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from the disc, and instead leaves it in the barn to collect dust. Production 
grinds to a halt, and B begins to incur substantial economic damages. In the 
subsequent breach of contract action, the issue of damages will be 
compounded by B’s failure to mitigate damages. The question then will be 
whether it was reasonable for B not to salvage the parts from the new disc 
and cause preventable economic loss. Of course, S’s argument will be that it 
was not. 
In a world where B has not altered the new disc to mitigate his losses, S 
will likely invoke the duty to mitigate as a defense to B’s claims of 
economic loss. In this world, B will be left wishing he had salvaged the 
parts for re-use in his old disc—but it will be too late. Who, between B and 
S, should be responsible for this loss? All other things equal, had S 
performed on the contract, the loss would not have occurred. B would have 
no outside cause precluding the realization of his full economic potential. 
The new disc would have been operable, and his farming operation would 
have continued unimpeded. The answer to this question relies on traditional 
concepts of reasonableness. It would be unreasonable for B to simply scrap 
the new disc and refurbish the old one without providing S an adequate 
opportunity to inspect it. It would also be unreasonable for B to rely on a 
contractually required maintenance inspection to justify an unannounced 
alteration to the disc at the cusp of litigation—when only B knows that it is 
imminent. Both situations would justify a spoliation sanction, but in neither 
of them would it be reasonable to mitigate damages, preemptively, by 
salvaging the new disc. Consequently, the reasonability of the plaintiff-
buyer’s conduct determines whether the duty to preserve evidence and the 
duty to mitigate damages are mutually exclusive or not.  
Consider the following: if B gives S ample opportunity to inspect the disc 
and vocalizes his discontent with the conduct alleged to constitute the 
breach, then any subsequent alteration will be a reasonable mitigation of the 
damages. S’s failure to act upon a reasonable opportunity to inspect will 
shift the fault to S and absolve B of any potential spoliation claim. B bought 
the disc, B owns the disc, and B has a right to dispose of his property as he 
chooses. If S does not diligently seek his own legal protection by acting 
reasonably and inspecting when given the opportunity, B should be held 
harmless when his own protective conduct—salvaging the new disc and 
getting the farm running again—ultimately precludes S from forming a 
defense for trial.
219
 The law purporting to resolve the Duty Dilemma should 
not allow S to have his cake and eat it too. The spoliation claim against B 
                                                                                                                 
 219. See Kirkland, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 613.  
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for deconstructing the disc is only viable as long as S acts reasonably 
himself. A defendant-seller’s unclean hands can and should render a 
spoliation claim untenable. Once the opportunity to inspect is given, S must 
seize it. 
The duty to mitigate damages is generally an affirmative defense 
reserved for defendants seeking to attribute some of the total damages to the 
negligent conduct of the plaintiff.
220
 As a result, the duty to mitigate is a 
sword of Damocles that shapes plaintiffs’ behavior before and during 
litigation. Attempting to be the law’s reasonably prudent person, plaintiffs 
seek to minimize their damages by taking reasonable steps to ensure that 
damages are not exacerbated. Plaintiff-buyers who have been sold a 
defective product should be wary. The law has conditioned them to 
minimize damages when prudence and reason would require it. But when a 
breach of contract action is imminent, plaintiff-buyers should resist 
mitigating damages until it is absolutely reasonable to do so. This 
‘reasonableness’ standard is not, like the duty to mitigate, a reference to the 
plaintiff’s obligation to take steps to avoid damages. Instead, 
reasonableness in the context of the Duty Dilemma should be couched in 
terms of spoliation. Providing an adequate inspection is pivotal. Only once 
an opportunity to inspect has been given is mitigation reasonable. It is the 
key that unlocks the duty to reasonably mitigate damages.  
Some may suggest an alternative solution to the Dilemma. A spoliation-
centric view might contend that the Duty Dilemma is resolved by relying 
purely on the dictates of spoliation doctrine. Such an alternative 
construction would posit that the duty to mitigate damages is a legal leisure 
that ceases to exist in the spoliation context; spoliation doctrine leaves no 
room for the duty to mitigate. The purpose of spoliation is to preserve 
essential evidence for trial at a time when a defense has yet to be made. 
Therefore, the duty to mitigate damages does not apply if it requires 
altering relevant, material evidence necessary to allow the defendant-seller 
to form its defense. There are a number of reasons why this alternative fails. 
First, spoliation is a dormant issue in all litigation. Although hindsight 
successfully illuminates key moments when the duty to preserve was 
actually the strongest, a theory that attempts to resolve the Duty Dilemma 
must take into account the prospective nature of transactional negotiations. 
When parties agree to make a deal involving the underlying object of future 
spoliation litigation, it is presumed that those parties intend to benefit by the 
terms of the deal. They expect that the contract will be honored and that the 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See Sackett v. Rose, 1916 OK 2, ¶ 14, 154 P. 1177, 1180. 
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opposing party will act in good faith. In some cases, unfortunately, these 
expectations are not met, and litigation ensues. But the commencement of 
litigation should not clip the plaintiff-buyer’s wings. If the law expects 
plaintiffs to both preserve evidence and mitigate damages, something has to 
give. To realize the benefit of its bargain, the plaintiff-buyer should 
mitigate its damages, even if that means committing otherwise prima facie 
spoliation. Any other approach would essentially condone breaches of 
contract without any corresponding effort to soften the blow for the victims, 
amounting to forfeiture of the plaintiff-buyer’s property. 
Second, the duty to mitigate damages is of equivalent legal status as 
spoliation and should not be discarded when the two collide. Because 
spoliation has the potential to shape the entire landscape of litigation, there 
is a temptation to elevate it to a higher priority than the duty to mitigate. 
But there is no compelling reason to do so. The duty to mitigate damages 
shapes plaintiffs’ conduct in all types of litigation, not just those involving 
spoliation issues. If a plaintiff fails to act reasonably and mitigate its 
damages, it will find a defendant lurking eagerly to prey on its misstep. To 
avoid this and protect business interests, society requires plaintiffs to 
minimize the damage when reasonable prudence would allow it. An 
approach that places the duty to mitigate on the backburner would condone 
economic loss in circumstances where that loss could be avoided. 
Finally, the last clear chance doctrine articulates the importance of 
mitigation in the context of spoliation and suggests that a plaintiff-buyer 
has more than a duty to mitigate damages; because of its unique position in 
litigation, it has a broad duty to avoid harm at all material stages of 
litigation. Recall that the last clear chance doctrine is a long-standing 
approach to negligence law that requires defendants to prevent harm to 
others even when they are the sole proprietors of their own misfortunes.
221
 
When the duty to preserve evidence collides with the duty to mitigate 
damages, the plaintiff-buyer is often saddled with the prospect of economic 
loss as a result of the defendant-seller’s misconduct. Prior to the 
commencement of litigation, the buyer has the “first clear chance” to 
apprise the seller of impending litigation and provide an opportunity for 
inspection. Armed with the resources necessary to avoid imminent 
economic loss, the buyer also has the “last clear chance” to prevent the 
amplification of the harm after the defendant has breached the contract. 
Thus, the concept of the last clear chance (and its contrapositive—the first 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See Okla. Ry. Co. v. Overton, 1932 OK 353, ¶ 7, 12 P.2d 537, 538 (quoting Pa. R.R. 
v. Swartzel, 17 F.2d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 1927)). 
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clear chance) fundamentally ties the duty to preserve to the duty to mitigate. 
By characterizing the Duty Dilemma as a series of legally significant events 
where the plaintiff-buyer has the last clear chance, at multiple stages, to 
avoid unnecessary harm, the resolution of the Dilemma becomes clearly a 
plaintiff-oriented endeavor.  
Although this is a counter-intuitive result—admittedly, it was the 
defendant-seller who breached the contract—the nature of spoliation 
doctrine and the duty to mitigate inherently shifts the burden to the 
plaintiff-buyer. The buyer’s decision to commence a breach of contract suit 
sets the stage. The foreseeability of litigation, the first prong of the 
spoliation analysis, is at the mercy of the buyer’s whims. As a result, the 
point at which the duty to preserve evidence arises, a thing that is generally 
not precisely knowable, is in fact precisely knowable by the plaintiff-buyer 
who is contemplating the future lawsuit. This places the onus squarely on 
the buyer to preserve the relevant evidence and provide the seller an 
adequate opportunity to inspect it. No party to the litigation—besides the 
plaintiff-buyer—knows which evidence will be necessary, or which 
inspection opportunity will be the last. Accordingly, no party is better 
positioned to contain the amount of harm than the buyer. The inescapable 
conclusion is that the plaintiff-buyer has the exclusive duty to reconcile the 
duty to preserve and the duty to mitigate.  
Mariposa Farms got one thing right. The duty to preserve evidence and 
the duty to mitigate are not mutually exclusive. With sufficient notice and 
opportunity to inspect, altering the evidence in mitigation of damages can 
become reasonable. However, the court missed on an opportunity to fully 
articulate the solution to the Duty Dilemma. By holding that the plaintiff’s 
preservation of component parts, photographs and expert test results were 
not enough to avoid a spoliation sanction, the court effectively took the 
power to mitigate spoliation damages away from plaintiffs.
222
 It had an 
opportunity to take the next step in resolving the Duty Dilemma but left 
much to be desired.  
It is inevitable that plaintiff-buyers in the position of buyer A or 
Mariposa Farms will find a defendant-seller unresponsive to its opportunity 
                                                                                                                 
 222. See Howell v. Maytag, 168 F.R.D. 502, 503, 507 (M.D. Penn. 1996). In Maytag, a 
fire, allegedly caused by a defective microwave, damaged a substantial part of the plaintiff’s 
home. Id. at 503. While the plaintiffs preserved the microwave, the electric outlet and 
wiring, and took photographs of the scene, the court held that the renovation of the damaged 
areas precluded Maytag from examining other possible explanations for the cause of the fire. 
Id. at 507. The opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiffs on the veracity of the preserved 
evidence was deemed an insufficient substitute for an independent investigation. Id.  
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to inspect. Furthermore, it is also conceivable that a notice to inspect will 
catch a defendant-seller at a time when it cannot perform an inspection and 
the plaintiff-buyer has no time to wait. When time is of the essence, and 
economic loss is imminent, plaintiff-buyers should not be forced between a 
rock and a hard place. The law must bend when circumstances demand 
flexibility. Plaintiff-buyers who have no choice but to mitigate economic 
loss by altering and repurposing evidence should be encouraged to take 
photographs, preserve component parts, and retain an expert to test the 
object. In certain cases, the court may find that these efforts can adequately 
protect defendants and give them a sufficient basis to form a defense.
223
  
Needless to say, it is likely that in certain circumstances, particular 
objects will not be conducive to the buyer-plaintiff’s attempts to mitigate 
spoliation damages. The complexity or uniqueness of a machine might 
preclude the possibility of adequately protecting the defendant-seller’s 
opportunity to prepare a defense. The theory upon which a party intends to 
base its defense may require eliminating alternative causal explanations and 
therefore require a comprehensive investigation of the damaged items or 
areas.
224
  
Mariposa Farms, it seems, may have arrived at the correct conclusion 
despite employing limited reasoning. Although it did not consider whether 
buyers in the plaintiff’s position could ever adequately protect the 
defendant-seller in the way it chooses to alter the evidence, the court gave a 
perfunctory explanation as to the insufficiency of the buyer’s photos, 
records, and testing. This should be treated as one of the central tenets of 
the Duty Dilemma analysis. When the plaintiff-buyer has unilaterally 
altered the primary evidence in mitigation of damages, but it has preserved 
component parts, taken photographs, and performed before-and-after 
testing, has the defendant been prejudiced to an extent that warrants 
spoliation sanctions? This case-by-case analysis is best left for the courts to 
resolve. Ultimately, though, it is a question that should inform the Duty 
Dilemma and shape buyers’ and sellers’ conduct before and after litigation.  
The final wrinkle in the Duty Dilemma is timing—namely, when exactly 
did the spoliation occur? As the case law shows, it is common for 
alterations to be made in violation of a discovery request after the 
commencement of litigation.
225
 In those cases, the “foreseeability of 
                                                                                                                 
 223. Kirschen, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 172 (finding that a substantial renovation of a previously 
damaged apartment did not prejudice the movant because photographs had been taken and 
the movant was the prior tenant). 
 224. See Howell, 168 F.R.D. at 507.  
 225. Barnett v. Simmons, 2008 OK 100, ¶ 17-18, 197 P.3d 12, 19. 
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litigation” prong is useless—litigation has already begun. As Mariposa 
Farms shows, spoliation that occurs after the commencement of litigation is 
particularly egregious.
226
 The explanation is simple. Litigation has 
commenced and has presumably revealed to the parties which evidence will 
be relevant to the plaintiff’s argument. Should that evidence be altered in 
the wake of a litigation hold or discovery request, bad faith is a likely 
player.  
It is not quite as simple when evidence is altered prior to 
commencement. Should parties to future litigation become locked in 
negotiations over repairs or maintenance inspections due to a breach of 
contract, the fluidity of the legal status of such negotiations only adds to the 
uncertainty. Again, only the plaintiff-buyer truly knows when litigation is 
on the horizon. But that is precisely why the Duty Dilemma is so unique. It 
presents itself at the cusp of litigation after the contract has been breached 
and amidst the turmoil that follows. There are no discovery requests, no 
court orders, and in some cases, not even the necessary scintilla of evidence 
suggesting to the defendant-seller that litigation is approaching. There is 
nothing but two disgruntled parties attempting to rectify the breach of a 
contract of sale. That is why Mariposa Farms can only take the Duty 
Dilemma so far in its quest for reconciliation. It dealt with alterations made 
after the commencement of litigation. The timing of the spoliation 
considered in Mariposa only captured part of the picture, and only that part 
of the picture that was already somewhat decipherable. The Duty 
Dilemma’s most pressing issues present themselves when litigation is not 
pending, when the possibility of litigation first blossoms in the plaintiff-
buyer’s mind. Thus, when parties are attempting to resolve the Dilemma 
outside of litigation, Mariposa’s refusal to consider whether plaintiff-
buyers may protect defendant-sellers themselves should not be controlling. 
Mariposa relied on limited facts. When parties find themselves outside of 
litigation, and only the plaintiff-buyer knows that a future action is 
imminent, the law should encourage the plaintiff-buyer to preserve 
components, perform tests, and take photographs. The window to mitigate 
damages is small. Plaintiff-buyers often find themselves under economic 
duress, juggling the prospect of granting an adequate opportunity to inspect 
without failing to mitigate damages. Accordingly, the holding of Mariposa 
should be relaxed to allow plaintiffs to protect defendants when the 
defendant either cannot or has failed to do so itself.  
                                                                                                                 
 226. Mariposa Farms, LLC v. Westfalia-Surge, Inc., No. CIV 03-0779 JC/LAM, 2005 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49951 (D.N.M. Feb. 3, 2005). 
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V. Conclusion 
The duty to preserve evidence and the duty to mitigate damages are not 
mutually exclusive. Mariposa Farms held as much. But the reality of the 
Duty Dilemma goes much deeper. When a plaintiff-buyer alters material 
evidence in mitigation of damages, it must first provide the defendant-seller 
an adequate opportunity to inspect it. “Reasonableness” guides the analysis. 
A plaintiff-buyer must exert reasonable effort to mitigate its damages after 
a breach of contract, but the duty to preserve evidence emerges as soon as 
litigation is reasonably foreseeable. Thus, when a plaintiff-buyer invokes 
the “duty to mitigate” as a defense to the defendant-seller’s spoliation 
claim, the question will be whether the buyer provided the type of 
inspection that would make mitigating the damages reasonable in light of 
the spoliative conduct.  
Not all forms of inspection that a buyer may provide are adequate. In 
order to show that an inspection opportunity was legally sufficient, and that 
mitigating damages was in fact a reasonable thing to do, the plaintiff-buyer 
must afford more than just a routine inspection. It must be the type of 
inspection that has its eyes on litigation. Deciding whether an inspection 
opportunity was sufficient is not new territory; courts should apply the 
same analysis involved in issues of proper notice.  
The Duty Dilemma also requires that plaintiff-buyers protect defendant-
sellers by preserving component parts, taking photographs, and performing 
expert testing before making alterations. Time is of the essence. Despite the 
complexity of the issues involved, there are some cases where a plaintiff-
buyer’s photographs, test results and remaining parts would be enough for a 
defendant-seller to build its defense. In those cases, courts should 
encourage plaintiffs to take these protective measures and mitigate their 
damages as quickly as possible. However, the plaintiff-buyer must absorb 
all the risk. If the photographs, tests, and parts are decidedly insufficient for 
the defendant-seller to form its defense, and no adequate inspection 
opportunity has otherwise been provided, the plaintiff-buyer should be 
sanctioned for spoliation. The Duty Dilemma is built on fine, grey lines and 
limited time—a deadly concoction. Although the defendant-seller breached 
the contract, it will never be the beast of burden—the brunt of the legal risk 
rests upon plaintiff-buyers with the last clear chance to avoid the Dilemma 
from arising in the first place.  
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